W. examine the characteristics of a largely ignored low-turnout group-people who have recently moved. We find that neither demographic nor attitudinal attributes explain their lower turnout. Instead, the requirement that citizens must register anew after each change in residence constitutes the key stumbling block in the trip to the polls. Since nearly one-third of the nation moves every two years, moving has a large impact on national turnout rates. We offer a proposal to reduce the effect of residential mobility on turnout and estimate that turnout would increase by nine percentage points if the impact of moving could be removed. The partisan consequences of such a change would be marginal.
Fifty-three percent of the voting age population went to the polls in the 1980 general election. In the previous two years, one-third of all adults moved. We investigate the connection between these two facts and show that the turnout rate in the United States reflects in part the low turnout of those who have moved. The relationship of mobility to turnout is particularly interesting because movers are nearly as interested in politics and as fully convinced that they have a say in what the government does as people who have stayed put. Drawing on our research on mobility, we offer a proposal we believe would bring more people to the polls. We find that turnout would increase by nine percentage points if the effect of moving were removed. Finally, we assess the political consequences of reducing the deleterious impact of moving on turnout.
For most U.S. citizens the trip to the polls is a two-step process. First one must register; then and only then can one vote. Election day is not likely to slip by unnoticed. Lavishly publicized, it is the climax of a long, hard-fought competition, the result of which is widely awaited. Everyone except an absentee votes on the same day; the act itself is a shared experience. None of this is true of registration. Deadlines, requirements, and procedures are shrouded in obscurity. In most states registration is closed in the month before election day, when the excitement and publicity of the campaign reach a peak. It should not be surprising that 31 % of all U.S. citizens of voting age failed to register for the 1980 general election nor that this country's dismal showing in international comparisons of turnout is due in large measure to our registration system, in which the individual, not the government, bears the responsibility for establishing one's eligibility to vote. 1 The registration barrier does not impede all sections of society equally, a fact AMERICAN POLmCAL SCIENCE REVIEW VOL. 81 NO.1 MARCH, 1987 only partially recognized in the numerous voter registration campaigns aimed at various groups believed to need help in dealing with the barrier. One obvious category is newly eligible young people facing their first opportunity to vote and not familiar with registration procedures. A second and larger group is people not sufficiently interested or skilled to surmount the bureaucratic hurdle of registration. The identifying characteristic of these people is low education; they are usually described as "the poor and minorities. " A third group whose voting is impeded by the registration requirement consists of those who have moved recently. Whenever one moves, whether it is down the street, to a nearby town, or across the country, it is necessary to register anew. As a result, movers (those who moved within two years of election day) had a turnout rate in 1980 just as low as young people or the uneducated. Moreover, the movers greatly outnumber these other groups. In 1980, movers represented 29% of voting age citizens, while people with incomes below the poverty line, blacks, and those just old enough to vote in a presidential election were respectively 22%, 11%, and 10% of the electorate. Although the residentially mobile are the largest light-voting group, they have received little attention from scholars. Before analyzing movers, we will examine more closely our basic assertion-that registration is indeed a major impediment to voting.
The Registration Obstacle
The decentralization of election administration, combined with the primitive level of record keeping in many jurisdictions, creates something of a mine field for researchers attempting to establish how many people are registered in order to compute how many of those who are registered go to the polls. Each side of the 46 percentage computation is questionable; each deficiency contributes to underestimating turnout. The numerator of this computation-the number of votes castis somewhat less than the number of all voters because it excludes spoiled ballots, people who go to the polls but do not vote for a presidential candidate, and those whose write-in votes are not counted. The Census Bureau estimated that counting all such ballots would have increased the official turnout figure by about two percentage points in 1976 and one point in 1980 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1982, 7).
The greater difficulty is the denominator, the number who are registered to vote. It is important to understand that state registration records are not a satisfactory source because there are no widely employed methods of removing in a timely fashion the names of people who have died or moved. Most states do purge the names of those who have not voted for a prescribed length of time, most commonly four years. But some people will have died and a great many will have moved before their time is up, thus any state's records will always be out of date. Moreover, at least 20% of the population lives in states with no purging requirement at all.
The inadequacy of state records may be judged by a recent episode in Rhode Island, a state that purges the names of those who have not voted for five years. In the fall of 1983, informational pamphlets on the impending statewide election were routinely mailed to the state's 530,000 registrants. Because these are mailed at the bulk rate, in the past all undelivered ones had been destroyed by the post office. But in 1983 the Secretary of State, Susan L. Farmer, arranged for the post office to return undelivered pamphlets to her office. More than 100,000 came back because the addresses were not at their official voting addresses. In California, the Secretary of State's office estimated in 1986 that 9 % of all regis-trations are "deadwood" -people who have died or moved. Because all state registration rolls are inflated in this way, voter turnout cannot be accurately measured by dividing the number of votes cast by the number of persons registered.
Surveys do not present this problem and are a more satisafactory source of data for our purposes. Of those available, we have most confidence in the Vote Validation Study conducted as part of the University of Michigan Center for Political Studies 1980 National Election Study (NES), in which interviewers visited county offices to establish through direct inspection of the records whether each respondent had registered and voted (see Appendix). The major drawback of this source is the somewhat "upscale" character of the Michigan sample, which underrepresents poor people, particularly uneducated young men. (For a comparison of data sources used in the study of turnout, see the Appendix.) Doubtless this is why the vote-validated Michigan NES sample shows a 1980 turnout rate of 60%. While this is surely something of an exaggeration, it should be noted that the 52.6% official turnout figure reported by the Census Bureau understates turnout. Z The question addressed here is whether registration requirements are a significant deterrent to voting. The answer is clearly affirmative. Eighty-seven percent of the registered respondents in the Michigan NES sample voted in 1980. The 1980 Voter Supplement of the Census Bureau's Current Population Survey (CPS), based on unverified responses from a more representative sample of 114,944, yields an estimate that 88.6% of those registered voted. In short, those who are registered vote. This finding leads to a critical shift in perspective. Traditionally scholars have asked why people don't vote. 3 The fact that registration is virtually equivalent to voting changes the question. The problem instead is to understand why people do not register. We believe that 47 many U.S. citizens are not registered because they have recently moved.
The bureaucratic tasks required to vote are a greater impediment for some groups than for others. This observation applies to the impediments to registration far more than those to voting itself. In Table  1 we provide convincing evidence that registration is the critical hurdle. Only 51 % of citizens with a grammar school education voted in 1980, compared with 84 % of those with more than four years of college, a gap of 33 percentage points. The gap, however, narrows to 17 percentage points when the comparison shifts to registered respondents. The less educated act much more like the better educated, once they have crossed the crucial barrier of registration.
This pattern is even more pronounced for different age groups. The differences in turnout among age groups almost disappear when the comparison is with people who have registered. Only 42 % of those aged 18 to 24 made it to the polls in 1980, far behind the 69% turnout rate of people 35 and older. Yet among young people who managed to register, 86% voted, compared with 90% of those aged 35 to 64 and 85% of those over 64.
Most interesting of all is the relationship of political interest to turnout among those registered. People who say they hardly ever follow politics are half as likely to vote as are those who say they pay attention most of the time; half of the former group are registered, compared with 83% of the latter. Yet once people who profess no political interest do register, they are very good bets to vote. Fully 74% of them voted in 1980, compared with 91 % of the avid political fans who were registered.
Who Moves?
In order to understand how many people are affected by the obstacle of registration, it is important to emphasize that characteristics we will examine. Staying. put for more than two years seems to be something of a dividing line in the relationship between mobility and turnout (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, 52) . Table 2 summarizes the more relevant demographic and attitudinal characteristics of movers and stayers (people who had lived in the same place for more than two years). The most striking thing about the movers is their youth. Sixty-eight percent of the movers, while only 23% of the stayers, were under age 35. Perhaps equally predictable is the somewhat higher educational level of the movers. Forty-four percent-compared with 33 % of the stayers-had attended college. The difference in income between the two groups is almost marginal. Twenty-six percent of the movers and a third of the stayers enjoyed family incomes of at least $25,000 in 1979. The racial character of the two groups is identical. Finally, the movers are overwhelmingly renters, while ~he four political activities used in this index were (1) attendance at political meetings, (2) work for a party or candidate, (3) display of a campaign button or sticker, (4) membership in a political organization or club.
Source: 1980 National Election Study.
most stayers own their own homes. This thumbnaU sketch offers reasons for differing expectations about movers' turnout. Their youth argues for light voting, their higher educational attainment hints at a contrary effect. That so many movers rent suggests lower voting rates since people who own their own homes turn out at a l'tigher rate than do renters 49 (Kingston, Thompson, and Eichar 1984, 131-50) . With so many variables, multivariate analysis is called for to identify the relationship of any particular variable to turnout.
At least three published studies fill the bill; all agree that mobility strongly depresses turnout (Cassel and Hill 1981; Verba and Nie 1972, 139-46; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, 50-54) . The most thoroughgoing of these studies demonstrated that, with demographic variables and registration laws held constant, people who had lived at their current addresses for less than a year before the 1974 election had a turnout rate 22 percentage points lower than those who had not moved for at least 10 years. People who had stayed put for 1 to 2 years were 19% lower, and even those who had lived in their current homes for 3 to 5 years were nine points lighter voters (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, 52)~ There was a time when movers faced residency requirements of up to two years, which were quite an obstacle to quick resumption of the voting habit. These onerous laws were struck down by the Supreme Court in 1972 (Dunn v. Blumstein 1972 . In almost every state the residency requirement is now 30 days or less. Movers are still light voters despite the removal of significant legal barriers because of the need to reregister and the low priority that this action has for them. People in a new home have all sorts of arranging and adjusting to do, from redecorating to mastering innumerable details of domestic administration: where to shop, how to get to work, how to spend recreational time. Registering to vote is drab and boring, a weak claimant for attention. What is more, half of all moves occur from June through September (Heiden 1981, 48-51) . Such summer movers have little time to register before the deadline, which is most commonly 30 days before the election, that is, the first week in October. In short, movers do not face legal obstacles to registering, but this step takes a back seat to the many things that must be done when trying to settle down in a new home.
Although movers are the biggest lightvoting group in the country, virtually no attention has been given to their characteristics, other than to note that they are mostly young. We begin our analysis with so a point of great importance: while movers are much less likely than stayers to vote, they share with them most of the interests, attitudes, and forms of behavior that are usually associated with voting. Movers are just as likely as stayers to talk about the campaign, pay attention to political items in the news, think they have a say in politics, deny that 'politics is too complicated to understand, and assert that public officials care what people like themselves think. They are almost as likely to care which party wins the presidential election, to be interested in the campaign, and to follow politics most or some of the time. They are equally likely to engage in political activities other than voting. These findings would lead us to expect movers to vote as much as stayers, but only 48% of them voted in 1980, compared with 65 % of the stayers. Even those movers who participate in politics are much lighter voters than activist stayers.
A Methodological Interlude
The data source on which we have relied up to this point is the 1980 NES conducted by the University of Michigan Center for Political Studies. The standard source of most academic research on voting behavior and public opinion for 30 years, the NES includes dozens of questions about respondents' attitudes toward candidates, issues, parties, and the political process itself; as well as many items on aspects of political interest and behavior. Moreover, we do not have to rely on respondents' claims about registration and voting; these points were checked at the relevant county records office. One disadvantage of the NES is its sample size: with 1,437 cases in the vote validation sample, few analyses are possible in which individual states are the unit of analysis. By the same token, some important demographic categories are so sparsely populated as to engender anxiety. Sample size is the least of our worries with our second data source: the Voter Supplement of the Census Bureau's CPS. The CPS includes all the relevant demographic questions found in the NES, but its political content is limited to questions on registration and turnout, and these are not validated. Its advantages are a somewhat more representative sample (see Appendix) of enormous size: 114,944 cases even after we deleted noncitizens and cases where the interviewer did not ascertain if a vote had been cast. This great number of cases enables us to analyze the behavior of respondents in states with election day registration and other unusual state-level contextual variables. We can, moreover, achieve unusually precise population estimates, even for small groups. We will present analyses using both surveys when this allows us to profit from the advantages of each. Should the different samples give us similar findings, we would have increased confidence in our conclusions.
In our analysis we have chosen to use turnout as the dependent variable. As discussed earlier registration and turnout are almost the same thing. We have performed multivariate analyses using both registration and turnout as dependent variables. Residential mobility as an independent variable has a large and statistically significant impact on both turnout and registration. Overall, there is little difference between explaining regis- tration and explaining turnout. We report our analysis on turnout, rather than registration, because turnout is the variable of interest.
The dependent variable in our analysis -turnout-is dichotomous; therefore the most appropriate statistical technique to measure the effect of any independent variable-mobility, education, agewould be one that specifies the nonlinear form of the relationship and makes correct assumptions about error terms. Consequently we have employed probit analysis in this paper.
The Effect of Mobility on Turnout
As a preliminary step, we examine the simple bivariate relationships between mobility and registration, and mobility and turnout. In Table 3 we display these relationships. We show that 48% of people who had lived 2 years or less in their residences voted in 1980, compared with 58% of those who had stayed put for 3 to 5 years and 60% for those in the 6-to-10 year category. Turnout leveled off only among people who had lived in the same place for more than 10 years, 72 % of whom voted. The data are very similar for registration, as shown in the middle column of Table 3 . In the right column we show that the percentage of the registered who voted did not vary appreciably by mobility. Even among the movers, 87% of the registered went to the polls. Our first major task is to examine the relationship between mobility and turnout, with other independent variables controlled. The probit coefficients for both the NES and CPS samples are presented in Table 4 . We show that mobility has a substantial and statistically significant impact on turnout when all other variables are controlled. This finding is consistent with other research and thus is not particularly surprising.
More noteworthy are the strong posi-52 tive influences of home ownership and marriage. 4 These effects are independent of age, income, and mobility (and attitudinal variables in the NES sample). We think that homeowners are more likely to feel a stake in the society and feel connected to their community, and that these ties account for their higher turnout. We distinguish between this sense of being rooted and the more plausible explanation of the stayers' higher turnout: more time to take care of the administrative chore of registering. Most movers, after all, were already living in the same county before they shifted residences, and thus are not likely to need an extended period of time to become familiar with local issues and candidates. Moreover, we are talking about participation in a presidential elec-. tion, where knowledge of the relevant issues and candidates and identification with the appropriate symbols is not lost by moving from one town or state to another. By the same token, married people face the same registration obstacles as the unmarried, yet they are more likely to vote. They have an inherent support and motivational system that single people lack (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960, 109; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980,44-46) . Information costs may also come into play. Only one spouse need invest time and energy in learning how and where to register after a move, but both partners benefit. A single person does not enjoy this advantage.
The equation using NES data is more fully specified because of the attitudinal variables not available in the census data. Political interest, "external" political efficacy ("1 don't think public officials care much what people like me think"), and belief in the importance of voting in local elections are all substantively and statistically significant in their relation to turnout. (Although a belief that voting in most local elections is unimportant decreases the probability of voting by a whopping 18 %, it should be noted that only 12% of the sample holds this view.)
Variations in the Effect of Mobility
Having established that mobility depresses turnout, we next investigate variations in that effect. Is everyone's probability of voting equally depressed by moving, or do some kinds of people respond differently to the experience? There are at least three dimensions on which movers vary and that seem likely to affect their probability of voting. First, they differ in their demographic and attitudinal attri-53 butes. Second, their life situations are not the same: some movers are single, some married; some are homeowners, some are renters. Finally, the legal environment into which they move will vary from state to state with regard to registration requirements.
We begin by examining the relationship of mobility to turnout at different levels of education. In Tables Sa and 5b we show that the impact of moving varies inversely with education. College graduates are decidedly less hindered by moving than people with less education. With all other variables in the NES equation held constant (see Table Sa ), people with college degrees who had moved within six months of the interview were 13 percentage points less likely to vote than if they had lived in the same place for at least 11 years. Those with less than a high school education in the same situation were 21 percentage points less likely to vote. 5 In other words, moving has a larger impact upon those with a lower probability of voting in the first place. Among people with six months or less residential stability, those without a high school diploma have a 37% probability of voting, compared with a 77% probability for college graduates.
In Table 5b we show much the same pattern. Using the CPS sample, we have enough cases to break down the categories more finely. People with some graduate education are less affected by mobility than are those with just a college degree. Indeed, they so quickly begin voting that there is scant room for improvement as the months in their new homes lengthen into years. Their turnout rate after six months is only seven percentage points below their rate at maximum residential stability. In both tables the probability of the best-educated people voting increases modestly with greater residential stability. Well-educated movers seem to hit the ground running; even just after changing their address they still turn out at 88 % in the CPS study. Two other aspects of the effect of education emerge in Table 5 . First, while each increment in education tends to raise the likelihood of voting, the sharpest break is between those who have obtained a college degree and those who have not. People who did not attend high school, high school graduates, and college dropouts increase theirprobability of voting by almost identical amounts as they remain longer in their residences. Turnout of college graduates increases more slowly. Second, the familiar relationship between education and turnout is strongest for recently moved citizens and progres- sively declines among those who have stayed put for longer periods. That relationship never comes close to vanishing, but it is weaker among long-term residents than among the more mobile respondents.
The relationship of mobility to turnout by political interest is almost identical to that by education: the lower the interest, the less turnout among recent movers and the more residential instability reduces the probability of voting. The relationship of interest to turnout declines progressively as stability increases, although it remains strong evl!n among the most stable. Note for Sa and 5b: The entry in each cell is the probit estimate of the effect on turnout of living at one's current residence for the indicated length of time compared to the turnout of those in the same educational group at 11 years of residential stability for the NES sample or 6 years for the CPS sample. aThe probability of voting of an individual with the indicated amount of education who had lived in the same place for 11 (or 6 years, with all the other variables in the equation controlled.
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While mobility accentuates the impact of education and political interest on turnout, this is not the case with age. Moving has a strong and fairly similar negative effect on the turnout of all age groups. A very recent change of address decreases the likelihood of voting by 18 percentage points for people aged 18 to 21 and has only slightly less effect on older people. Across all age groups the probability of voting increases with stability to about the same extent. 6 In summary, mobility has a strong and differentiating effect on people with different levels of education and political interest and, somewhat surprisingly, a strong but uniform effect on those at different ages.
Movers differ not only in their demographic and attitudinal attributes but also in their life-styles. As we saw, with all other demographic variables controlled, renters are considerably less likely to vote than are homeowners. Is this effect accentuated by how recently these individuals have moved? Apparently not. Renters and homeowners are both strongly affected by moving but to about the same extent. This is not to say that their probabilities of voting are the same. At 11 years of stability, renters have a 64 % probability of voting compared with 77% for owners. Both mobility and renting have a substantial and independent depressive effect on turnout. Even the most recently moved homeowners vote as much as renters who have stayed in the same dwelling for 7 to 9 years. The relationship between ownership status and turnout seems to have different causes than that between mobility and turnout. The latter reflects the cost side of a costbenefit analysis of turnout: the administrative hurdle of registering impedes immediate resumption of the voting habit. But once we have controlled not only for mobility but for all the other variables in our probit equation (including education, interest, and income), it is difficult to see how renters face any ss impediments to registering and voting not experienced in equal measure by homeowners. The explanation would seem to lie on the benefit side: renters are less impelled to register, perhaps because of weaker feelings of societal membership.
The relationship between marital status and mobility and turnout is virtually the same as that with homeownership. Married people are heavier voters; the impact of moving on their likelihood of turning out is faintly weaker than for single individuals. 7 In short, the relationship of these life situation factors and turnout is compounded when mobility is added to the picture. Since this is true with everything else controlled, it suggests that being either a homeowner or married gives one a larger personal stake in the community, or more motivation to register and vote.
Finally, the legal environment in which movers find themselves differs from state to state. We argue that movers are light voters because of the need to reregister and the low priority of doing so. This leads us to expect the impact of mobility to decline as the importance of registration declines. This diminution would be most marked in the four states that permit election day registration-Maine, Minnesota, Oregon, and Wisconsin-and in North Dakota, which does not require registration at all. Turnout in these five states is far above the national level. In 1980, when 52.6% of the U.S. voting age population went to the polls, the comparable figures in the easy registration states ranged from 61.5 % in Oregon to 67.2% in Wisconsin and 70.1 % in Minnesota (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1983b, 492).
Initial analyses confirmed our hunch about the weaker depressive effect of mobility in the 5 states. A simple crosstabulation contrasting turnout at different stages of mobility in the two sets of states showed that people who had lived in their homes for no more than six months had a 61 % turnout rate in the 5 states, com- 47 respondents in the easy registration category, however, this data set is not ideal for state-level analysis. This is the strong point of the CPS, which has 8,341 respondents in the five easy registration states. Here we were disappointed. As we show in Table 6b , the findings are in the predicted direction, but the differences between the two groups of states are much smaller, at most two percentage points. This analysis suggests that mobility deters voting almost as much in states where registration is not so great a barrier.
We have seen strong evidence that mobility has a significant impact on registration and turnout. Among the most recent movers, differences in education and political interest significantly change the probabilities of registering and voting. These relationships weaken as residential stability increases. The long~r people live Note for 6a and 6b: The entry in each cell is the probit estimate of the effect on turnout of living at one's current residence for the indicated length of time compared with the turnout of those in the same state at 11 years of residential stability for the NES sample or 6 years for the CPS sample.
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at the same address, the more likely they are to vote, regardless of any other characteristic. Even less educated people with little interest in politics finally get around to registering if they live in the same place for several years. Differences in life-styles with regard to marital status and renting or owning one's residence also reveal a strong depressive effect on turnout as mobility increases, although the effect is fairly uniform. An early closing date for registration also depresses turnout among movers, although not as strongly as we expected.
How to Increase Turnout
If almost everyone who is registered votes, holding elections on Sunday, making election day a holiday, or extending the hours that the polls are open would do little to improve turnout. These measures are designed to facilitate people who are registered, who are already very likely to vote. Money, energy, and political capital should be invested in efforts that have more potential: getting people to register on the amply documented assumption that once people register, they vote.
We have established that movers are less likely to vote for no reason other than the need to reregister and the low priority that this action has. There is no question that election day registration would be particularly beneficial to such people. It is equally certain that this is a dead issue. President Carter's proposal for a national scheme did not even get out of a congressional committee in 1977, and there are no signs that the idea will soon be revived in Congress. In 1978 the voters of Ohio decisively rejected an election day registration plan enacted by the state legislature. This seems to be an idea whose time has come and gone.
A more feasible approach would be to concentrate on maintaining the registration of people who move. We propose a measure that would reduce the negative S7 effect of moving on turnout by linking the maintenance of registration to an action that is usually an intrinsic part of moving. Almost all movers file a change-ofaddress notice at a local post office before leaving their old home. According to the postal service, 40 million such forms were filed in 1983 and again in 1984. Some of these reported temporary moves, others were used by people who moved more often than once a year. If this form were modified to permit the mover to indicate that the move included a change of voting address and carbonized so a copy could be produced simply by filling out the form, the second copy could be sent by the post office to the chief election official in the state where the move originated. In 83% of all moves, this would also be the destination state. In the case of intrastate movers who were already registered, this copy could be accepted as adequate legal authority to reregister the individual at the new address. If the mover were not registered already, receipt of the notice might stimulate dispatch of a registrationby-mail postcard.
In any case, receipt of the notice would lead to cancellation of the old address registration. This would be an efficient and inexpensive way of removing deadwood from the registration rolls, thus eliminating perhaps the biggest opportunity for election fraud. Pruning the rolls would reduce the costs of election administration and of direct mail campaigning. Accurate registration records would also make jury selection more efficient and have a beneficial effect in those states where a proportion of the number of registered voters is used as a threshold for successful bond issue referendums or for signatures to qualify a proposition for the ballot.
We began to advocate this idea in September 1983, concentrating on attracting the attention of officials at the federal level. Action by the federal government is a necessary but not sufficient condition for enacting this proposal, which could be implemented only in a state that made the necessary changes in its voter registration laws. People who heard the proposal liked it, but at first there was a very small audience. In March 1985 a bill (HR 1668) to accomplish the federal aspect of our proposal was introduced by Representative Mel Levine (D.-CA), with three Republican and four Democratic initial cosponsors. A similar bill, S 1439, was introduced later that year by Senators Christopher Dodd (D.-CT) and John Chafee (R.-RI).
The first legislative action was in the House. Over two dozen more Representatives had cosponsored HR 1668 by July 1985, when it was the subject of a hearing by the Subcommittee on Postal Operations and Services of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. The chairman, Mickey Leland of Texas, and the ranking minority member, Frank Horton of New York, were both strongly favorable, as were two testifying secretaries of state, March Fong Eu, a Democrat from California, and Susan L. Farmer, a Republican from Rhode Island. Leaders of three groups interested in expanding voter turnout supported the bill but expressed fear that some states might use the procedure to purge names of movers and pay little attention to reregistering them. The postal service witness, the only outspoken critic, was subjected to skeptical questioning by Leland and Horton.
After the hearing there were several rounds of negotiations with the three voter registration groups on the one hand and with several state and local election officials on the other. The former wanted to avoid purging without reregistration and were untroubled by deadwood and administrative feasibility, major concerns of even the most progressive election officials.
Several criteria are important as policy makers ponder this proposal: cost, administrative feasibility, and political 58 implications. The postal service, which is not motivated to minimize the difficulties, has produced several estimates of the cost of sorting change-of-address notices and transmitting them to the appropriate election official. In the fall of 1985, the most recent and lowest estimate was 30¢ per form. If every state participated in the program, the total cost of postal service processing would be $12 million. No state could participate without enacting its own implementing legislation, however. This process would take years and some states doubtless would never choose to join in. Therefore the $12 million figure is an upper limit that will probably never be attained. Also, this cost will be mitigated by substantial savings in printing and postage as deadwood is eliminated. Partly because the savings would be realized by the states and partly because of the mood of fiscal stringency in Washington in the mid-1980s, HR 1668 provided that these administrative costs would be borne by participating states.
The plan's administrative feasibility is attested by the endorsement of HR 1668 by 11 secretaries of state, a number of individual county clerks, the National Association of County Recorders and Clerks, and the legislation committee of the California County Clerks Association. On the other side of the ledger is a resolution of opposition passed by the Florida State Association of Supervisors of Elections.
HR 1668 was reported in June 1986 by the Subcommittee on Postal Operations and Services. In September the full Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, by a unanimous voice vote, ordered the bill reported. For a moment it appeared that HR 1668 might pass the House on suspension of the rules and-just possibly -be attached to a bill on the Senate floor. Instead, it became a casualty of the election-year rush to adjourn. At the time of writing, its prospects in the 100th Congress seem bright.
Political Impact
And then there is the political question, How would the interests of the two parties be affected by easing the effects of moving on turnout? This question can be answered in large measure by further analysis of our data to see how a voting population enlarged by weakening the relationship of mobility to turnout would differ from the current voting population. Before considering the political implications of our proposal, we will see how effective this proposal would be in increasing turnout.
We begin by estimating the turnout rate that would result from eliminating the effect of mobility on turnout. How many people would vote if everyone participated at the same rate as the most stable segment of the population? This question cannot be answered simply by assuming that the mobile would vote as much as the stable because the two groups differ with respect to other variables affecting turnout. Among other things, movers are predominantly young renters, two characteristics associated with low turnout. We can use the equations in Table 4 to make the appropriate forecasts. After 10 years in the same residence, turnout no longer increases with additional stability. Therefore we estimated what the turnout rate of the sample would be if everyone voted as if they had lived at the same address for 11 years, as opposed to their current probability of voting. On the basis of the NES pro bit equation, we estimate that the national turnout rate would increase by nine percentage points under these conditions. S This figure defines the outer limit of our proposal's potential consequences; indeed, it doubtless exaggerates them. Enactment and nationwide implementation of HR 1668 would not eliminate the relationship between residential mobility and turnout, if only because of interstate moves, which would be beyond the reach of our proposal. Even a nine-percentage 59 point gain in turnout would not alter this country's next-to-Iast position in international rankings (Wolfinger, Glass, and Squire 1985) because mobility is by no means the only explanation for low U.S. voting rates. Nevertheless, an increase of nine, or seven, or five percentage points would be a major accomplishment, comparable to the gains produced by election day registration and without any risk of election fraud.
Other than increasing the number of voters, what consequences would ensue from eliminating the effect of mobility on turnout?9 The proper comparison to answer this question is between actual voters and the hypothetical larger voting population. 1o The characteristics of the actual and projected voting populations are summarized in Table 7 . In most instances, the two groups are almost identical. The projected voters would be a bit younger, with people under the age of 34 accounting for 32 %, compared with their 28 % share of those who actually voted in 1980. This is the only difference in demographic .characteristics that exceeds sampling error. Other differences are both statistically and substantively insignificant. People without college degrees would account for 77% of all voters, in contrast to the actual 75 %. People with family incomes under ten thousand dollars would increase from 18 % to 19.2%.
Some people concerned with votingincluding some officials who administer elections-deplore efforts to "make voting too easy" because they believe that a certain amount of difficulty screens out those citizens whose commitment to electoral participation is unacceptably weak. Whatever the merits of this argument as prescriptive political theory, its relevance to our present concerns is limited because HR 1668 would affect only people who had registered before they moved. This is not, however, tantamount to saying that if the mobile voted at the same rate as the stable, the voting population would dis- play an equal level of civic virtue because those movers who most quickly return to voting are likely to be the most alert and concerned part of the mobile population .
• They have, after all, surmounted a barrier to participation not faced by the stayers.
If the costs of moving were reduced, they might be joined at polling places by movers with somewhat less civic virtue, but still, perhaps, no less virtue than stayers. The answer to these speculations is in Table 7 , in which we show that the least politically concerned citizens, those who say they follow politics "hardly at all," would account for the same 10% of the projected expanded voting population that they do of actual voters. People with intermittent interest in politics would be 22 % of the expanded population, up two percentage points from their share of actual voters; and the proportion of people who follow politics some or all of the time would drop two points. None of these differences approaches sampling error, and we conclude that HR 1668 would not lower the political interest of the U.S. voter. The most interesting question, of course, is the political consequences of expanding the electorate by reducing the effect of mobility on turnout. We can calculate the number of Democrats and Republicans in the projected larger voting population and compare that number to . the partisan distribution among actual 1980 voters. This reveals a microscopic loss for the Democrats, from 49% of the actual voters to 48.6% of the projected voters. More noteworthy-although still below the level of statistical significanceis a loss of nearly two points for the Republicans, achieved almost entirely through a gain in the proportion of voters who are Independents. If we assume that this group splits its vote evenly, the net damage to the Republican party is more on the order of one percentage pointY It is true that elections have been won by a smaller margin and that no politician likes to give up any advantage, even a small one. Yet no responsible analyst of survey data would take seriously so tiny a gap between respondents in a sample reduced to barely a thousand cases.
Our conclusion about the evanescent character of the apparent loss in Republican identifiers is buttressed by the findings for self-identified liberals and conservatives, which are also in Table 7 . In contrast to a two-percentage point loss for Republicans, it is liberals who suffer a similar decline from the actual to projected voters. The proportion of conservatives remains the same. The liberal loss comes from middle-of-the-road respondents and those who say that they have not thought enough about liberalism and conservatism to make a choice. None of these differences in partisan and ideological identification comes close to statistical significance. We cannot find much in these findings to alarm either party.
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Conclusion
Movers resemble stayers on the motivational variables that are directly related to voting: interest in politics, attention to the campaign, concern about the outcome, and political efficacy. These similarities support our conclusion that movers' lower turnout reflects the administrative burden of registration rather than lower civic virtue. We would expect movers to vote more if the burden of reregistration were eased. We have proposed a method to accomplish this and estimate that if the effect of mobility on turnout were removed, turnout would increase by nine percentage points. Expanding the voting population in this way would produce no consequential advantage for either party.
Appendix 1980 Vote Validation Study
The Vote Validation Study covered respondents in the conventional American National Election Study (NES) time series sample (N = 1,614). This sample was to be interviewed before and after the 1980 election; those whose postelection interviews were not completed were, nevertheless, included in the Vote Validation Study. For a variety of reasons, information on registration status or voting could not be gathered on 177 of the 1,614 respondents. We have deleted these cases from our analysis (categories 0,4,5, 6, 7, 8, 9 on variable 1207), which is limited to the 1,437 respondents for whom validated data are available on both registration and voting. See the relevant codebook: University of Michigan Center for Political Studies (1982, Education squared: the square of the value coded for education (variable 429), which ranged in single years from 0 to 17. Mobility (variable 718): less than 6 months = .25; 6 to 12 months = .75; 1 to 2 years = 1.5; 2 to 3 years = 2.5; 3 to 4 years = 3.5; 4 to 5 years = 4.5; 5 to 6 62 years = 5.5; 6 to 7 years = 6.5; 7 to 8 years = 7.5; 8 to 9 years = 8.5; 9 to 10 years = 9.5; more than 10 years = 11. Marital status (variable 409): 0 = never married, divorced, separated, widowed, common law, other; 1 = married. Political interest (variable 974): 1 = hardly at all; 2 = only now and then; 3 = some of the time; 4 = most of the time. Homeownership status: 0 = do not own home; 1 = own home.
Mobility: less than 1 month = .04l; 1 to 6 months = .292; 6 to 11 months = .75; 1 to 2 years = 1.5; 3 to 5 years = 4; 6 years = 6.
Education squared: The square of the respondent's coded value for education, ranging from 0 to 18 years.
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1. This figure is from the Vote Validation Project of the 1980 National Election Study (NES), which is described in the Appendix. For comparisons of U.S. and foreign performance on different measures of turnout, see Glass, Squire, and Wolfinger (1984) and Wolfinger, Glass, and Squire (1985) . For a multi-63 variate analysis demonstrating that the greatest part of the disparity in turnout between the United States and other countries reflects U.S. registration procedures, see Powell (1986) .
2. Part of this underestimation is a result of the failure to count some ballots we have described. A more important-source of underestimation is the denominator of the official turnout percentage: the entire population age 18 and above, including noncitizens. Deleting noncitizens from the denominator of the percentage calculation for the 1972 election raised the estimated turnout by 1.2 percentage points (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, 116) . The noncitizen proportion of the population has grown considerably since then. This trend alone may be responsible for the decline in official turnout from 55.2% in 1972 to 52.6% in 1980. We cannot duplicate the 1972 correction for 1980 because we have not succeeded in obtaining from the Census Bureau an estimate of the voting age citizen population in 1980. Deleting the noncitizens from the Current Population Survey (CPS) increases the estimated 1980 turnout by three percentage points (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1982, 5).
3. For an exception, see Erikson (1981) . He, however, came to a very different conclusion from ours:
Thus, one reason that people vote may be to stay registered. . •. Remove the cost of registration, and some who otherwise would have voted stay home because it is no longer necessary to vote in order to stay registered. (p. 274) 4. Despite their marginal levels of statistical significance, variables for homeownership, age, and age squared were kept in the NES equation for two reasons. First, we had strong theoretical grounds for including them in our equations and the sign of each of the suspect coefficients is in the expected direction. Second, the CPS coefficients for the variables are statistically very significant, which strengthens our belief that they belong in our analysis.
5. Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980, 54) found that moving within a year of the 1974 election had aslightly greater negative effect on the turnout of the college-educated, a difference that disappeared after two years of stability. We have no explanation of this disparity, other than noting that the newer finding is more compatible with the theoretical approach in both studies and that the 1974 finding is based on a subsample of 7,936 cases, while our probit analysis of the CPS sample employs 103,575 cases.
6. Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980, 52-54) found that the effect of mobility on turnout increased with age.
7. We also examined the relationship between both homeownership and turnout, and marriage and turnout. Unmarried renters have the lowest probability of voting and are hardest hit by moving, while married homeowners have the highest turnout rate and are a bit less affected by changing their residence. Single owners and married renters are in between, turning out 9 percentage points above single renters and 11 points less than married owners.
8. The most stable mobility category in the CPS data is six years or more, hence f,J)r this data set we were only able to estimate the indrease in turnout if everyone voted as if they had lived in the same place for six years, as opposed to their actual probability of voting. Under this condition the national turnout rate would rise by 5.5 percentage points.
9. What groups of respondents are to be compared to each other to answer this question1 Because the status quo is an obvious reference point, one group is actual voters. If we were interested in the characteristics of those people deterred by mobility from voting, the other comparison group would consist of the hypothetical 9%. But the question we are trying to answer is different: How would elections change if mobility no longer depressed turnout1 We answer this question by comparing actual voters not to the potential 9% increment but to the hypothetical larger voting population created by adding the 9% to existing voters. Because a measure like HR 1668 would not eliminate the depressive effect of mobility, this method produces somewhat inflated effects, but we have no alternative. We calculated the characteristics of projected voters by the method used by Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980, 139) .
10. One factor is beyond quantitative calculation. One or the other party may be able through its own efforts to reregister supporters who move. If this were the case, enactment of our proposal would, by governmental action, do for both parties something that one party could do for itself. This is not a wholly hypothetical observation. In some places Republicans are using their superior resources and organizational coherence to identify movers likely to be Republican and also movers likely to be Democrats, whose continuation on the registration rolls can then be protested. If these practices become an important part of Republican calculations, our proposal's bipartisan appeal will be limited to its effectiveness as a scourge of deadwood. This might not be negligible, particularly in those places where Republicans believe that large-scale exploitation of deadwood for fraudulent purposes is something of a Democratic monopoly.
11. In point of fact, Independents usually vote predominantly for the winning presidential candidate (Keith, Magleby, Nelson, Orr, Westlye, and Wolfinger 1986 ).
